In the face of extreme weather events such as Thailand's mammoth floods and last month's flash floods in southern Philippines, the world awaited with bated breath the outcome of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP17) in Durban, South Africa.

The whimper of a deal in Durban consisted of three main packages. The first was extending to five years the Kyoto Protocol, which in 1990 committed 37 developed countries to lower (by 2012) their greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) by 10% from 1990 levels. Signed and ratified by all developed countries except the United States in 1990, the Protocol however suffered a further setback soon after Durban, as Canada, Russia, and Japan backed out, with the US who never signed on in the first place. It virtually places the European Union (EU) alone among the original developed economies still committed to the Protocol. This means that only 15% of global emissions, Europe's share, are now covered by the Protocol.

This also means that practically up to 2020, only the EU will be legally bound to cut its emissions, at a rate of 20%, a commitment it made even before Durban via the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). As for the rest of the governments, they will, until 2020, only offer voluntary targets, probably those they submitted after the 2010 Cancun Conference, a step backward from the Kyoto Protocol.

In effect, the Durban talks did not produce any new and deeper commitments. What Europe and the other countries would be doing to cut GHGs under the Durban deal, they would be doing anyway on their own even without the Durban talks.

Much of the dispute over the Protocol boils down to a reading of climate change history and justice. The Group of 77, which includes China, India, and the Philippines, contends that the developed economies, led by the US, Europe, and Japan, should bear the brunt of the GHG reductions. As the longest-running industrial economies, they are responsible for the bulk of the emissions. An estimate by Dr James Hansen of the National Aeronautic Space Agency (NASA) found the US and Europe to have been responsible for 27.5% and 30.6% respectively - the great bulk - of the fossil fuel-derived CO2 pollution of 346 gigatons from 1751 to 2006.

The US and other governments disregard this accusation. Arguing that China and India today are the biggest GHG polluters, they question the relevance of the Protocol, asserting that without China and India among those legally bound for GHG cuts, global warming is certain to run its course anyway.

The second package is the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. It has been aptly described as a non-binding agreement to arrive at a binding-agreement on GHG reductions by 2015 to be implemented by 2020, after ratification by their respective governments.

What alarms the environment community and many developing-country governments are basically three points.

First is that these "current commitments" are not "ambitious" and deep enough - less than half - for what is needed to prevent a rise beyond 2 degrees Celsius, the critical level above which is expected to usher in drastic climate change, severe drought, more frequent and massive storms and floods, and sea level rise engulfing small islands.

The second is that the climate change actions called for are postponed yet for 2020 despite the urgency of the problem. Expressing disappointment at the Durban outcome, Philippine Climate Change Commission officials for their part described the event as a "missed opportunity" and reflective of "governments' lack of political will."

Under the current pledges of GHG cuts, the global emissions in 2020 would be 50 billion tons, equal to that in 2011. But even just for a 50-50 chance at keeping the global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius, scientists estimate that the global emissions have to drop to 44 billion tons in 2020, to less than 35 billion tons in 2030, and to less than 20 billion tons in 2050.

The third point is that the targets of the Durban deal remain quite vague. For instance, it fails to set a definite 2050 or 2020 target on global emissions, although climate scientists already spelled out what is needed.

On the other hand, the Platform is also seen by many "as a half-full glass," making it possible for the talks to continue despite the monumental challenges ahead. Yet another breakthrough to come out of Durban is the commitment of governments apart from the developed countries identified in the Kyoto Protocol, especially China and India, to participate in a legally-binding deal by 2020.

This newfound commitment is seen to demonstrate that even as governments differ and clash in how much share of the climate injustice they will each atone for, they all support and agree on the latest climate science.

The Platform has therefore been described as a roadmap that presents a way out of the climate crisis. In a major way, it eliminates the long-standing stumbling block, the complaint of the US government that it unfairly excludes China and others from legally-binding emission cut requirements.

And yet the roadmap is not as simple or easy as it may look. The governments still have to sort out the complex details of each country's share of emission cuts. This means that the contentious deep-rooted debate on historical climate justice will continue to be played out in the tough negotiations ahead.

The third package is considered by many to be Durban's best result. It consists of the set of funds for mitigating and adapting to climate change among developing countries, including forest conservation and rehabilitation. The Durban talks allotted a UN-supervised Green Climate Fund of US$100 billion yearly by 2020 to developing countries as promised in Copenhagen in 2009.

This early, though, it is not yet clear how and where these are to be funded. In line with this, Durban also set up a mechanism for research and development of technologies for climate change mitigation and adaptation to enable transfer and diffusion from developed to developing countries.

Two basic scenarios for a post-Durban world are being forecast. The first, an optimistic one, projects a greener global economy. The US and EU will agree to deep emission cuts, buoyed by a drive to take advantage of newer wind, solar, and other renewable energy technologies, driving down prices below those of oil and coal. However, the caveat is that this scenario will entail certain "ifs," such as the European economy being able to ride out its ballooning debt and budget crisis, and green-oriented governments coming to power in the US.

In this bright scenario, along with India, China would be given more leeway to find a happy balance between its still coal-driven high growth and its strong push toward global leadership in solar and wind technologies. Whether or not the world can move on toward a green economy will greatly depend on how much public pressure can be put to bear on governments in favor of more drastic and adequate climate action.

The second scenario is not pleasant. In this, renewable energy fails to take off and the governments of the major CO2-polluting economies lose all political will to beat back climate change decisively. A deal could be established in 2015 for implementation in 2020 but as with Durban, the question is: will this be adequate? What is worrisome for many developing countries such as the Philippines is that while they may be the most vulnerable to climate disaster, the factors that will expose them most to such extreme risks may be out of their hands.

What is certain is that the risks of global warming beyond 2 degrees Celsius loom ever larger on the horizon. The situation thus points to a larger than ever need for communities and countries to buckle down, adapt, and cope with the worst destructive impacts of climate change.